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IN (PARTIAL) DEFENSE OF STRICT 
LIABILITY IN CONTRACT 
Robert E. Scott* 
Many scholars believe that notions of fault should and do pervade 
contract doctrine. Notwithstanding the normative and positive ar- 
guments in favor of a fault-based analysis of particular contract 
doctrines, I argue that contract liability is strict liability at its core. 
This core regime is based on two key prongs: (1) the promisor is li- 
able to the promisee for breach, and that liability is unaffected by 
the promisor's exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precau- 
tions; and (2) the promisor's liability is unaffected by the fact that the 
promisee, prior to the breach, has failed to take cost-effective precau- 
tions to reduce the consequences of nonperformance. I offer two 
complementary normative justifications for contract law's stubborn 
resistance to consider fault in either of these instances. First, I argue 
that there are unappreciated ways in which courts' adherence to 
strict liability doctrine at the core of contract reduces contracting 
costs. In addition, I argue that a strict liability core best supports 
parties' efforts to access informal or relational modes of contract- 
ing, especially where key information is unverifiable. 
"Contract liability is strict liability." 
- Second Restatement ofContracts 
Introduction 
The Restatement's oft-quoted assertion about the nature of contract li- 
ability is one of the most imprecise generalizations ever made about the 
common law of contract. Numerous scholars have pointed out that, in fact, 
there are many notions of fault that infuse contract law, ranging from pre- 
scriptions against intentional "bad behavior," to assessments of the 
reasonableness of an actor's behavior in assessing both liability and dam- 
ages. But while there are indeed many "fault lines" in contract,1 speaking at 
* Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for Contract and Economic 
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1. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1994) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Fault Lines]; George M. Cohen, The Fault That Lies Within Our Contract Law, 
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1445 (2009) [hereinafter Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law]; George M. Cohen, 
The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 941 (1992). 
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that level of generality has little analytic purchase.2 In short, from a distance 
the fault lines in contract appear broken and indistinct. 
In this Article, I propose to defend the notion of strict liability that lies at 
the core of the Restatement's claim. By its terms, the Restatement does not 
rule out fault-based considerations for claims based on promissory estoppel, 
fraud, bad faith, mistake, excuse or a host of other issues. But the availabil- 
ity of these principles only in select circumstances justifies a core no-fault 
regime.3 This core regime is based on two key prongs: (1) the promisor is 
liable to the promisee for breach, and that liability is unaffected by the pro- 
misor's exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precautions; and 
(2) the promisor's liability is unaffected by the fact that the promisee, prior 
to the breach, has failed to take cost-effective precautions to reduce the con- 
sequences of nonperformance.4 In terms of the Restatement conception, 
then, contract law is strict liability without a contributory negligence de- 
fense. 
Notwithstanding the many illustrations of fault lines in contract, the 
Restatement's assertion, as limited above, is descriptively accurate. The core 
of contract law as applied in the courts is a no-fault regime. This is so even 
though theorists mount powerful arguments on efficiency grounds for a cost- 
benefit analysis of promisor and promisee behavior in particular cases, and 
even though contract doctrine appears to invite just such an analysis. For 
example, if the promisor carelessly fails to take efficient precautions ex ante 
that result in breach ex post, the "willful breach doctrine" invites courts to 
increase damages to deter such inefficient behavior. Similarly, if the pro- 
misee fails to take efficient precautions prior to the breach that would reduce 
or eliminate losses, the mitigation principle invites courts to apply a "con- 
tributory negligence" bar to recovery. However, a large sample of cases 
shows that courts decline to employ the willful breach doctrine to deter an 
inefficient breach. And despite evidence that the promisee has failed to take 
precautions prior to breach that would have reduced losses, courts adhere 
strictly to the rule that the promisee's mitigation responsibility is not trig- 
gered until the promisor breaches. 
The courts' reluctance to adopt a comparative fault standard in assessing 
the core question of liability for breach is all the more surprising iven that 
comparative fault principles are found elsewhere in contract law, most nota- 
bly in the doctrines of unjust enrichment and unilateral mistake.5 Viewed in 
this light, the question is not why contract law fails to acknowledge xplic- 
itly the many different fault principles that it embraces implicitly. Rather, 
2. See Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions 
and Damages, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1501, 1502-04 (2009) (criticizing Cohen and others for lack of 
clarity and precision in analyzing different fault-based notions of contract). 
3. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 1 1, introductory note, at 309-12 (1981). 
4. See infra Part I. 
5. The doctrine of unjust enrichment and the doctrine of unilateral mistake both have com- 
pound liability rules that hinge on the "reason to know" standard. For unjust enrichment, see Day v. 
Caton, 119 Mass. 513 (1876); for unilateral mistake, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 153(b). 
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the puzzle is why courts adhere to a no-fault regime at the core of contract 
liability even though contract doctrine invites them to consider fault in other 
instances. 
In Part I of this Article, I set out the case that courts are committed toa 
strict liability regime at what I call the "core" of contract law. This Part fo- 
cuses on the evidence of strict liability as demonstrated by (a) courts' 
reluctance to use the willful breach doctrine to deter inefficient breach by 
promisors, and (b) courts' reluctance to use the mitigation principle to deter 
inefficient overreliance by promisees. In Part II, I offer two complementary 
normative justifications for contract law's stubborn resistance to fault prin- 
ciples at its core. I argue that here are unappreciated ways in which courts' 
adherence to strict liability doctrine reduces contracting costs. In addition, I 
argue that a strict liability core best supports parties' efforts o access infor- 
mal or relational modes of contracting, especially where key information is 
unverifiable. I conclude, therefore, that both autonomy and efficiency values 
support the claim that commercial parties will prefer strict liability rules to 
fault-based rules for assessing performance and the response to nonperform- 
ance. 
I. The Strict Liability Core of Contract Law 
A. The Promisor's Behavior: The Willful Breach Doctrine 
Among the many debates about fault in contract law, one principle re- 
mains unchallenged: a promisor is strictly liable for defective performance 
or nonperformance despite her exercise of due care. Even the most fervent 
adherents of fault in contract law concede that the law always applies this 
rule strictly.6 Thus, the promisee does not have to prove that the promisor 
failed to take cost-effective precautions against breach.7 Nor, for that matter, 
can the promisor escape liability by showing that he breach was caused by 
exogenous factors beyond her control.8 
But there is a doctrine in contract law that invites courts to adjust liabil- 
ity or damages if the promisor's breach was "willful." Courts have attached 
this doctrine primarily to the choice of damage measures in cases involving 
breach of a contract for services. In such cases, promisees commonly sue for 
the "cost of completion" - of purchasing a substitute performance in the 
market. However, the cost of completion sometimes exceeds the gain that 
the seller's performance would have produced. This problem usually occurs 
in construction contexts. In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, for example, the con- 
tractor deviated from the agreed-upon performance in an apparently minor 
way, but the costs of remedying that defect were much greater than the 
6. Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 1, at 1238. 
7. Id. 
8. This statement must be qualified to the extent that the promisor can establish an excuse 
owing to the fact that the risk in question was not allocated in the contract. 
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reduction in property value that the deviation had caused.9 Similarly, in 
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., a lessee agreed to restore the 
lessor's property after the lessee had used it, but the costs of restoration 
turned out to be much higher than the resultant increase in property value.10 
In cases like these, where repair involves unreasonable destruction of the 
contractor's work, or the cost of completion is grossly disproportionate to 
the benefit obtained, the owner can recover only the diminished market val- 
ue on the ground that the standard remedy would produce "economic 
waste."11 
There is substantial uncertainty, however, as to the appropriate circum- 
stances for applying the "economic waste" doctrine. A key doctrinal 
prerequisite is the finding that the contractor has substantially performed the 
contract in good faith and that the breach was not "willful."12 In both of the 
celebrated cases noted above, the court declined to find fault with the pro- 
misor's breach. In Jacob & Youngs, Justice Cardozo invoked the economic 
waste doctrine to limit the owners' damage award to the diminution in value 
caused by the breach. He found (at least implicitly) that the contractor's 
breach was accidental and not willful. In Peevyhouse, the majority did not 
address the willful breach doctrine directly, but Justice Irwin dissented on 
the ground that the breach "was wilful and not in good faith."13 Thus, the 
majority at least implicitly rejected application of the willful breach doctrine 
to the facts in the record. 
To be sure, the precise behavior intended to be captured by the willful 
breach doctrine is unclear.14 However, the concept should be sufficiently 
capacious to embrace "inefficient behavior" by the promisor. By this stan- 
dard, a breach is willful when the promisor fails to take cost-effective 
precautions in performing a contract that is ex ante efficient and then 
breaches the contract to avoid incurring substantial osses. In using this 
standard to evaluate the actions of promisors in cases such as Jacob & 
Youngs and Peevyhouse, it is important to recognize that the promisees in 
such cases will have prepaid for the service in a master contract. Prepay- 
ment is often ignored by courts and commentators because, in such a 
contract, the services are bundled together and are not separately priced. For 
example, the royalty on the mineral lease in a case such as Peevyhouse is 
9. 129N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
10. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). In Peevyhouse, the diminished market value was $300 while 
the cost of completion was estimated to be $29,000. Id. at 1 12. 
11. See, e.g., Gerodetti v. Broadacres, Inc., 363 So. 2d 265, 267-68 (Miss. 1978); Johnson v. 
Black Bros., Inc., 879 So. 2d 525, 527 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). 
12. As Cardozo famously stated, "the willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his 
transgression." Jacob &. Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891. 
13. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 1 15 (Irwin, J., dissenting). 
14. See Craswell, supra note 2, at 1502 (" 'The word . . . "wilful" ... is seldom accompanied 
by any discussion of its meaning or classification of the cases that should fall within it.' 
" 
(quoting 5 
Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1123 (1951))); Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, 
Wilfullness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1517, 1525-26 (2009) (arguing that he willful breach doctrine is "largely epiphenomenal"). 
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smaller if the mining company agrees to restore the land at the end of the 
lease term, but rarely, if ever, is there an explicit "subprice" for the agree- 
ment to restore. Likewise, the cost of constructing a building is seldom 
disaggregated into separate prices for the promise to install the plumbing 
and the promise to correct defective work. Yet, no one would claim that he 
mining lessee agreed to restore for nothing, or that the building contractor 
did not charge for nonconforming plumbing.15 
Prepayment reduces the incentives for the promisor to take precautions 
ex ante that would reduce the ex post cost of completion. Promisors such as 
the contractor inJacob & Youngs and the mining company in Peevyhouse 
can sometimes reduce the cost of performance below the promisee's value 
by taking precautions between the time of contract and the time of comple- 
tion. But a prepaid promisor's incentive to invest efficiently in cost 
reduction ismaterially reduced if her damage exposure for failing to invest 
is capped by the diminished value measure. 
A finding of fault based on "inefficient behavior" in these situations i
appropriate if four key conditions are satisfied: First, the promisor is able to 
take a precaution during the course of performance that reduces the ex- 
pected cost of the contractually required service below its expected value to 
the promisee; Second, the promisee is an imperfect monitor and is unlikely 
to detect he promisor's lack of precaution; Third, the promisee may never 
(or only later) discover the promisor's failure to take precautions, and; 
Fourth, the promisor is able to perform the contractually required service x 
post, albeit at a much more expensive price. Where these conditions are sat- 
isfied, the economic waste rule should not be applied: restricting promisees' 
awards to diminished market value creates an incentive for sellers not to 
take the efficient precaution. Rather, courts hould invoke the willful breach 
doctrine: an award of cost-of-completion damages creates a positive incen- 
tive for sellers to take the efficient precaution.16 Cost-of-completion 
damages in such a case are an efficient deterrent against this moral hazard. 
The question, then, is whether the contractor's behavior in Jacob & 
Youngs ufficiently satisfied the "inefficient behavior" test to justify invok- 
ing the willful breach doctrine and considering fault in the assessment of 
damages. Virtually all the ensuing commentary has accepted Cardozo's cha- 
racterization fthe contractor's behavior in Jacob & Youngs as accidental 
and has justified the nonwillful characterization of the breach.17 
15. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the 
Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1610 (2008). The standard construction contract 
contains a separate promise by the contractor to correct any defective construction. This promise 
remains binding even after substantial performance of the contract. See e.g., American Institute 
of Architects, AIA Document A201-1997: General Conditions of the Contract for Con- 
struction (1997). 
16. This argument is formally set out in Schwartz & Scott, supra note 15, at 1652-57. 
17. See Craswell, supra note 2, at 1502 ("The builder in Kent used the wrong brand of pipe, 
apparently by accident  "); see also Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in 
Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 733, 743(1982). But see Thel & Sie- 
gelman, supra note 14, at 1526-27 (characterizing the contractor's behavior as negligent but 
justifying the result on other grounds). 
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Unfortunately, however, that characterization appears to be false. The ex- 
traordinary costs of completion in Jacob & Youngs resulted from the 
contractor's failure to inspect the pipe to ensure that it complied with the 
contract specifications. In dissent, Justice McLaughlin recited the key facts 
from the record and concluded that the failure to inspect was "due to gross 
neglect."18 The record in Jacob & Youngs thus shows that each of the four 
conditions supporting a finding of inefficient behavior was satisfied:19 
There was (1) an apparently efficient precaution - checking the pipe as it 
was delivered to insure that it met contract specifications; (2) evidence that 
the owner, through is architect, was an imperfect monitor (he was able 
conveniently to check only the first installment ofpipe but not the remain- 
der); (3) difficulty in discovering the unsatisfactory performance because 
most of the pipe was embedded in the walls of the house; and 
(4) performance that was inefficient ex post: The high cost of removal 
caused the ex post market price of performance to exceed the [diminished 
market value] by so much as likely to exceed the buyer's value from per- 
formance.20 
An analysis of the facts in Peevyhouse supports the same conclusion: the 
breach was a result of the mining company's failure to take ex ante precau- 
tions, and a fault-based analysis should have invoked the willful breach 
doctrine. As Judith Maute has shown, the mining company in Peevyhouse 
could have stripped the land with restoration costs in mind.21 Also, the plain- 
tiff, Garland, admitted at trial that (1) the owners had insisted that the 
regrading provisions be included in the contract; (2) they would not agree to 
the coal-mining lease unless the promise to regrade was included; (3) heavy 
rains caused the plaintiff to postpone the promised remedial work; and (4) in 
the interim, plaintiff relocated the grading equipment to another profitable 
site and decided not to return to complete the remedial work.22 
In short, declining to apply the willful breach doctrine and restricting the 
promisee to the diminished- value measure in the contexts these cases exem- 
plify is inefficient. This inference is supported by a more systematic 
examination of the case law. In order to evaluate how contemporary 
American courts treat economic waste claims, I recently analyzed a sample 
of 1 10 cases, most of which were litigated in the past two decades.23 In 
twenty-nine cases, the courts were faced with the question of the appropriate 
18. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting) ("[N]o 
examination . . . was made by the plaintiff, the subcontractor, defendant's architect, or anyone else, 
of any of the pipe except the first delivery, until after the building had been completed"). 
19. Note that we must assume, per Cardozo, that the failure to install the contract-specified 
pipe was, in fact, a breach. This assumption is supported in the case by the architect's refusal to give 
his certificate. 
20. Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 15, at 1654 n.108. 
21 . See Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of 
Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1341, 1429 (1995). 
22. See id. at 1413. 
23. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 15, at 1624-34. 
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measure of damages when the evidence showed that the cost to complete 
would greatly exceed the value of performance to the plaintiff.24 Nineteen 
cases had facts that were sufficiently clear to permit an inference that the 
seller could have taken cost-effective precautions to reduce the cost of per- 
formance.25 In these cases, where the sellers' actions likely would have 
reduced costs, the buyers' capacity to monitor was also likely imperfect: 
they were mostly amateurs, and they could not constantly be on-site. As 
discussed above, in cases such as these it is efficient for courts to award 
cost-of-completion damages, even where the ex post cost of performance 
significantly exceeds the buyer's ex post valuation. Such an award is effi- 
cient, as it induces the seller to take the precaution that would forestall the 
excess costs. Yet, in only one of the thirty cases did a court apply the willful 
breach doctrine and award the larger damages measure.26 
The evidence from Jacob & Youngs, Peevyhouse, and their progeny 
points in a single direction. Courts continue to follow the strict liability 
principle that he promisor's behavior is irrelevant tothe issues of liability 
and damages. In particular, courts decline the open invitation of the willful 
breach doctrine to apply fault-based principles in cases where strong argu- 
ments suggest that he breach was inefficient and should have been deterred. 
Before trying to justify this surprising conclusion, I next examine the second 
prong of the core strict liability idea: that the promisee's behavior prior to 
the breach is irrelevant toquestions of liability or damages. 
B. The Promisee's Behavior: The Mitigation Principle 
Common law courts have consistently held that a promisee need not take 
steps to avoid losses so long as the promisor has not clearly and definitively 
repudiated the contract.27 This rule limits the ability of courts to encourage 
both parties to take cost-effective precautions that will reduce the expected 
losses from a contract breach.28 Moreover, itis well established that, absent 
a legal restraint on the promisee's reliance actions, the promisee will over- 
rely under an expectation damages default rule.29 These inefficiencies can be 
24. Id. at 1625-27. 
25. Id. at 1659 &n. 123. 
26. Roudis v. Hubbard, 574 N.Y.S.2d 95 (App. Div. 1991) (applying cost of completion 
where contractor intentionally omitted styrofoam insulation and footing drains required by the 
plans). 
27. See, e.g., S. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. TRI Fin. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1185 (S.D. Tex. 
1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. S. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Crateo, Inc., 458 F.2d 688 
(5th Cir. 1972) ("Defendant had neither breached nor indicated an intention to do so; having not yet 
been injured by any breach of defendant's, plaintiff had no damages to mitigate."). 
28. The classic article is Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 11-19 (1985). See also Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investiga- 
tion as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. Legal Stud. 401 (1988); Charles J. Goetz & Robert 
E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. 
Rev. 967, 989-95 (1983). 
29. Under an award of full expectancy, the promisee will recover her full valuation, and thus 
she is motivated to invest in the subject matter of the contract until her marginal gain equals her 
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moderated, however, by careful application of the rules governing anticipa- 
tory repudiation. If promisors repudiate as soon as they are aware of events 
that will ultimately lead to nonperformance, they can, at least in theory, in- 
duce the promisee to mitigate sooner rather than later. 
A comparative fault analysis, therefore, should focus on the rules gov- 
erning anticipatory repudiation: the more likely that the promisee's behavior 
is contributing to the losses from breach, the more likely a court should be 
(1) to find that the actions of the promisor constitute a repudiation of the 
contract, and (2) to invoke at that time the doctrine of avoidable conse- 
quences and the promisee's mitigation responsibility. By interpreting 
anticipatory repudiation rules in this way, courts could motivate parties to 
avoid or reduce the breach costs that would otherwise result if the promisee 
were allowed to delay mitigation until the time of performance. 
To see this, consider an example in which Adam agrees on July 1 to de- 
liver an air conditioning unit to Christy on December 1 at a cost of 
$500,000.30 Assume that an explosion in Adam's plant on September 1 
causes a two-month delay in delivery that will cost Christy $100,000. Sup- 
pose, however, that if Adam informs Christy on September 1 of his inability 
to meet the contract deadline, Christy can redesign the building under con- 
struction to accommodate an air conditioning unit that is equivalent in 
quality but differently designed. Christy's total losses due to Adam's breach 
would then be only $40,000 - i.e. the $20,000 additional price of the substi- 
tute air conditioner plus the $20,000 additional cost to redesign the building. 
Adam would obviously prefer limiting his maximum loss to $40,000 by 
having Christy redesign her building. By repudiating on September 1, at the 
time of the plant explosion, Adam would hope to induce Christy immedi- 
ately to mitigate her damages by making the necessary adjustments. 
The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation thus can be used to extend the 
duty of mitigation to a period before the time for performance has expired. 
Because it potentially enables the parties to avoid wasteful actions taken in 
reliance on performance, applying the doctrine in this way brings actual 
contracts closer to the ideally efficient contract, one which would require 
parties to make all cost-effective adjustments to events occurring after the 
contract was formed. 
But courts have been reluctant o require mitigation at the time of repu- 
diation. The common law rule remains well established: the promisee can 
either seek damages at the time of repudiation or wait until the time for per- 
formance and recover market damages at that later date.31 As a result, 
marginal cost. But the promisee does not consider that performance would be inefficient insome ex 
post states of the world. In these states, the promisee's investment is a social waste. See, e.g., Wil- 
liam P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 Rand J. 
Econ. 39, 47 (1984) (concluding that under expectation damages buyers will choose a greater-than- 
efficient level of reliance). 
30. The discussion that follows draws on Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, Contract 
Law and Theory 815-18 (4th ed. 2007). 
31. Kg., Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952); Mo. Furnace Co. 
v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881). 
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promisees operating under the common law rule are free to exacerbate their 
damages by waiting until the time for performance to mitigate. And when 
promisees exercise this option, they undermine the possibility of mutually 
beneficial postcontract adjustments. The common law rule thus seems in- 
consistent with the fault-based, cost-benefit analysis embodied in the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences. Returning to our example above, giving 
Christy the option of waiting beyond the time of repudiation is inefficient 
because she will not internalize the cost of delay to Adam. Moreover, she 
will be motivated to wait as long as she can since she retains any benefits 
from a declining market while Adam must bear all the costs.32 
C. Summary 
As the above discussion has shown, in cases where courts are directly 
asked to consider the relevance of promisor and promisee behavior in as- 
sessing the core questions of liability and damages, the strict liability regime 
announced in the Restatement is alive and well. To be sure, that hese core 
questions remain grounded in a system of strict liability does not undermine 
familiar claims that elsewhere contract embraces fault-based notions. But it 
does deepen the puzzle as to why those fault lines have failed to penetrate 
the two core questions: will the promisor's liability be increased if it appears 
that breach was caused by her inefficient behavior, and will the promisee's 
recovery be diminished by evidence that his inefficient behavior contributed 
significantly to the quantum of loss? In both cases, the answer at common 
law and in contemporary litigation is a clear "no." In the next Part, I ask 
whether this rejection of a fault-based system at the core of contract can be 
justified. 
II. The Normative Case for Strict Liability 
The normative case for strict liability rests on two complementary argu- 
ments. Both are based on the claim that commercially sophisticated parties 
prefer strict liability rules over fault-based rules, especially at the core of 
contract.33 These arguments center on the revealed preference of commercial 
parties for precise or bright-line rules over broad standards and on a re- 
vealed preference for party autonomy in selecting precisely when and where 
standards are preferable to rules.34 Inthe first case, the preference for auton- 
omy in selecting between rules and standards permits parties to optimize 
32. The Uniform Commercial Code permits the promisee to wait a "commercially reason- 
able time" following the repudiation, and thus also fails a comparative fault analysis. U.C.C. § 2- 
610(a) (2004). 
33. In principle, the arguments outlined here might also be applied to contracts made by 
commercially unsophisticated parties. But defending an extension of the argument to such cases 
would require additional analysis to take into account a range of considerations that I do not under- 
take here. 
34. My argument that the law properly attends to the revealed preferences of commercial 
parties can be supported on both efficiency and autonomy grounds. And, to be sure, moral theorists 
may offer other normative arguments in favor of strict liability. 
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contracting costs by shifting them between the front end and the back end of 
the contractual process. In the second case, the preservation of formal rules 
offers parties the choice of improving contractual incentives by relying on 
informal or relational contracting as a complement to the formal contract. In 
this Part, I first consider the theoretical arguments that support the claim that 
commercial parties prefer formal rules in general and strict liability at the 
core of contract in particular. Thereafter, I evaluate the evidence that sup- 
ports the theoretical claims. 
A. Contract Design and the Choice Between Rules and Standards*5 
Why might commercial parties prefer strict liability to a fault-based re- 
gime? One answer lies in the trade off between contracting costs and the 
goal of improving contractual incentives. Commercial parties will weigh 
front- or back-end contracting costs against the incentive gains that they 
produce - what George Triantis and I have referred to elsewhere as the in- 
centive "bang" for their contracting-cost "buck."36 And they will prefer 
improved incentives of the sort we examined earlier only if those incentives 
do not generate even greater contracting costs. To understand parties' appar- 
ent preference for formal rules like strict liability, one must consider the 
contract-design challenges that they face in writing incomplete contracts.37 
Incomplete contracts are challenging because the parties must attempt to 
balance two seemingly inconsistent goals. One goal is to encourage "rela- 
tion-specific investments" that enhance the expected surplus from the 
transaction. But the commitment hat is necessary to motivate surplus- 
maximizing specific investments will typically conflict with the goal of pre- 
serving flexibility - which is necessary to halt those transactions that prove 
to have insufficient et value when uncertainty is resolved. 
One way to encourage initial investments i for the parties to write a 
contract with precise, unchanging terms or "rules," i.e., determinate out- 
comes that apply across the board regardless of the eventual state of the 
world. But because the rules are inflexible, they may not respond to what 
actually happens and may be inefficient ex post.38 Alternatively, if the future 
35. This discussion draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation 
in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation] 
and Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 
56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187 (2005). 
36. Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 35, at 817. 
37. Under conditions of uncertainty, contracts will be incomplete in the sense that informa- 
tion costs will make it impossible to distinguish ex ante the ex post states of the world that call for 
different obligations. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 115 (1999); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 
56 Econometric a 755 (1988); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 
J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 19 (1988). 
38. One solution is for the parties to renegotiate the contract once uncertainties are resolved. 
But renegotiation raises the risk of a hold up; and this, in turn, undermines the incentives for parties 
to make specific investments inthe first place. For discussion, see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Prop- 
erty Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990), and Benjamin Klein, Vertical 
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is very uncertain, the parties may instead emphasize the value of flexibility 
by drafting a contract with vague standards, i.e., "soft" terms such as those 
that require subsequent adjustment in good faith to new facts as they arise. 
But a promisor with the discretion to adjust performance is likely to choose 
the best alternative for him even though the self-interested choice is unlikely 
to be the best way to maximize the parties' joint welfare.39 
In short, neither precise rules nor vague standards can, standing alone, 
solve the problem of incomplete contracts. Therefore, parties predictably 
seek to optimize total contracting costs by trading off the respective benefits 
and costs of commitment and flexibility. They can do this by shifting their 
costs between the front and back end of the contracting process. For exam- 
ple, when the parties agree to bright-line rules, such as the buyer's 
obligation to purchase a precisely specified, customized machine at a fixed 
price, they encourage the seller to undertake the required investment by lim- 
iting the court's authority to determine their particular performance 
obligations. But this strategy requires the parties to rely on mere estimates 
of the likelihood of future vents. Alternatively, when the parties agree to a 
vague standard, i.e., to adjust the price of the machine in good faith as con- 
ditions subsequently require, they effectively delegate the specification of 
performance requirements to a court at the back end of the contracting proc- 
ess. This provides flexibility and allows them potentially to benefit from the 
court's hindsight advantage but at a cost of undermining the buyer's com- 
mitment o pay and the seller's willingness to invest. The parties thus choose 
between these front- and back-end specification mechanisms by comparing 
the benefits of ex ante commitment against the flexibility offered by the 
court's hindsight advantage.40 
This model of contract design suggests that courts should refrain from 
filling contractual gaps with broad standards in cases where the parties are 
silent. A court may be tempted (with the encouragement of one of the par- 
ties) to see gaps and to use fault-based octrines uch as mistake, excuse, or 
frustration as devices for implying standards into the parties' agreement. But 
this is generally an error. Commercial parties can include standards in their 
contract at relatively low cost. They also have superior knowledge regarding 
the context of their contractual relationship, which provides the basis for 
determining the optimal mix of precise and vague terms.41 As a rule of 
thumb, therefore, courts are wise to assume that the absence of vague stan- 
dards in commercial contracts is an instruction from the parties to focus 
interpretation on the precise terms of the contract. 
Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 
4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199 (1988). 
39. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 Yale L.J. 541, 602-03 (2003). 
40. The options available to the parties are even broader than the stark choice between rules 
and standards. With the aid of interpretation maxims, parties can design combinations of precise and 
vague terms that define more exactly the "space" within which a court has discretion in interpreting 
the contract. For discussion, see Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 35, at 848-56. 
4 1 . See, e.g. , Schwartz & Scott, supra note 39, at 545. 
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This preference for party autonomy in selecting what standards to use 
and when to use them supports the claim that commercial parties will prefer 
strict liability rules to broad, fault-based standards. In addition to the trade 
off between front- and back-end contracting costs, bright-line rules offer 
commercial parties the opportunity to resolve their disputes without a full- 
blown trial. It is plausible to believe that the more complex the factual issues 
in litigation, the easier it will be for one party to create disputes regarding 
the appropriateness of the other's behavior. Thus, litigation is likely to be 
more costly in a fault-based regime because the parties more frequently will 
have full trials. When parties weigh their contract design choices, they will 
not only consider the costs and gains from creating the deal initially; they 
will also consider the likelihood and costs of later disputes. That fault re- 
gimes increase the likelihood and cost of disputes explains why parties may 
prefer contracts that only crudely encourage efficient behavior but signifi- 
cantly reduce the contracting costs of enforcement. 
B. Rules v. Standards and the Choice Between Formal 
and Informal Enforcement2 
As suggested in the earlier discussion, contract design is not merely a 
matter of calculating the costs and benefits of negotiating particular terms in 
a contract. In addition to the front-end cost of negotiating a contract, parties 
must attend to the back-end problems of verifying and enforcing their re- 
spective obligations in court. A focus on the costs of verifying contractual 
obligations motivates parties to consider the choice between formal and in- 
formal means of enforcement. 
In many instances, an agreement between two commercial parties will 
be self-enforcing because both parties want to earn and preserve a good rep- 
utation so as to enhance their self-esteem and future business prospects.43 
Moreover, agreements will also be self-enforcing to the extent that the par- 
ties anticipate that the expected profits from future dealings are greater than 
the gains from breaching the existing contract.44 
Even where loss of reputation and the threat of retaliation are insuffi- 
cient to induce performance, powerful norms of reciprocity appear to 
enhance and extend the reach of informal enforcement. A substantial body 
of experimental evidence shows that a preference for reciprocity - i.e., the 
willingness to reward cooperation and to punish selfishness - can motivate 
42. This discussion draws on Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite 
Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641 (2003). 
43. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 39, at 557 (asserting reputations work well in small 
trading communities, where information about others' actions is common knowledge and boycotts 
of bad actors are readily enforced). 
44. Retaliation has its limits: the threat hat the other party will no longer deal with the pro- 
misor may be insufficient to induce performance if parties come to realize that the relationship is 
soon to terminate. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self -Enforcing Range of 
Contractual Relationships, 34 Econ. Inquiry 444 (1996). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 17 Dec 2015 19:39:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
June 2009] In (Partial) Defense 1 393 
cooperation even in arms-length interactions between complete strangers.45 
This evidence suggests that contracting parties frequently can (and do) turn 
to informal means of enforcement based on trust and reciprocity in addition 
to the desire to maintain a good reputation or the prospect of profitable fu- 
ture dealings. And if parties are able to rely on these informal methods of 
enforcement, they may be able to create contractual commitments that are at 
once sufficiently credible to motivate efficient investments ex ante and suffi- 
ciently flexible to ensure fficient adjustment ex post. 
So, what role does (and should) legal enforcement play in a world where 
informal enforcement is pervasive and robust? First, note that informal en- 
forcement generally is cheaper than formal enforcement because a party 
needs to expend costs only to observe the other's behavior, while formal 
enforcement requires additional resources in verifying that behavior to a 
court. Moreover, informal enforcement is often better than formal enforce- 
ment: parties can make credible promises regarding observable but non- 
verifiable measures of performance, thus achieving contractual objectives 
that may not be possible with formal enforcement.46 To be sure, there is still 
an important role for formal contract enforcement. Common sense tells us 
that relationships relying on informal enforcement can break down, and 
when they do, the parties will resort o costly litigation. When reciprocity 
breaks down in complex transactions, the courts can serve a valuable func- 
tion by making factual determinations to unravel complex behaviors.47 
Thus, a central question remains: how do the various means of enforce- 
ment interact with each other? The available evidence suggests that legal 
enforcement is often imperialistic - that an effort to superimpose l gal en- 
forcement on a regime of self-enforcement can displace or "crowd out" 
informal mechanisms.48 The experimental evidence of crowding out 
45. This substantial body of experimental evidence shows that individuals respond coopera- 
tively to generous acts and, conversely, punish noncooperative behavior. Moreover, individuals will 
repay generosity and punish selfishness even if doing so is costly and yields neither present nor 
future material rewards. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competi- 
tion and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. Econ. 817 (1999); Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract 
Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833 (1997); David K. Levine, 
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 Rev. Econ. Dynamics 593 (1998); Matthew 
Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1281 (1993). 
For a review of the literature, see Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Recip- 
rocity-Evidence and Economic Applications 2-3 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in 
Econ., Working Paper No. 75, 2001). 
46. Scott, supra note 42, at 1667-72. 
47. In complex interactions, a failure to cooperate may not be observable immediately, or 
else a cooperative response may be mistakenly interpreted as a defection from cooperative norms. 
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2050-53 
(1987). A disinterested a judicator may be in better position to sort out complex behavior, detect a 
breach, and, by imposing a predetermined sanction, forestall attempts by the aggrieved party to 
respond disproportionately. Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: 
Contract Theory and The Enforcement of International Law 100 (2006). 
48. A number of studies have confirmed the crowding-out hypothesis. For discussion see 
Scott, supra note 42, at 1688-92. Other recent experiments also show that if there is some probabil- 
ity of continued transactions, then legal enforcement that is limited to the verifiable dimensions of 
the agreement will enhance cooperation in the dimensions of the agreement that are nonverifiable. 
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undermines the argument that courts should adopt a broad, fault-based ap- 
proach to enforcing contracts. The understandable instinct to deter 
inefficient behavior may well prove counterproductive in the long run. As 
the evidence suggests, extending legal enforcement to the difficult-to-verify 
questions of willful breach and overreliance may well impair the efficacy of 
informal means of enforcement that rely instead on reciprocity norms. 
As we have seen, common law contract doctrine has resisted the invita- 
tion to imply broad fault standards of behavior at the core of contract. Thus, 
if a promise falls within the core of legal enforcement, contract law fills 
only a few gaps, using simple, verifiable strict liability rules when it does 
so.49 The evidence that there are informal means of enforcing commitments 
that courts cannot readily verify supports this approach. The more general 
lesson for courts, therefore, is that an effort o judicialize notions of com- 
parative fault and reciprocal behavior may well destroy the very informality 
that makes these mechanisms so effective in the absence of judicial en- 
forcement.50 
C. The Evidence 
While there are good theoretical reasons to believe that commercial par- 
ties prefer a strict liability regime to one based on fault, critics may argue 
that theoretical inferences about parties' intentions are fraught with peril.51 If 
commercial parties prefer a formal, strict liability regime, it may be argued, 
then why don't they say so? 
The short answer is that they do. A common provision found in many al- 
liance agreements is the following: 
The Parties' legal obligations under this Alliance Agreement are to be de- 
termined from the precise and literal language of this Alliance Agreement 
and not from the imposition of state laws attempting to impose additional 
duties of good faith, fair dealing or fiduciary obligations that were not the 
express basis of the bargain at the time this Agreement was made. 
The Parties are sophisticated business entities with legal counsel that have 
been retained to review the terms of this Alliance Agreement and the Par- 
ties represent that they have fully read this Alliance Agreement, and 
understand and accept its terms.52 
Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal 
and Informal Arrangements, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 261 (2004). 
49. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 847 (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. Toronto L.J. 369 
(2004). 
50. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. 
Legal Stud. 597, 615 (1990). 
5 1 . See Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 1 . 
52. Alliance Agreement between E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. and EarthShell Corp. (Jul. 
25, 2002), available at http://contracts.onecle.com/earthshell/dupont.collab.2002.07.25.shtml. 
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In addition to such anecdotal evidence from individual contracts, the 
available data support the strict liability theory. First, Lisa Bernstein's pio- 
neering work shows that parties who are members of trade associations - 
and thus who rely on both informal or relational enforcement as well as 
third-party enforcement - carefully preserve formal, strict liability rules and 
reject broad standards in assessing performance, breach and liability.53 
Bernstein argues that this regime can best be understood as a mechanism for 
preserving the space for both formal and informal norms to operate. 
Second, recent work by Eisenberg and Miller studying choice-of-law 
and choice-of-forum clauses in a data set of 2865 contracts provides empiri- 
cal support for the claim that commercial parties prefer the binary strict 
liability regime of the traditional common law.54 Specifically, their study 
showed that parties choose New York law in 46 percent of the contracts and 
New York as the forum state in 41 percent of the contracts.55 California, on 
the other hand, was chosen for its contract law in less than 8 percent of the 
contracts even though its commercial activity, as measured by the place of 
business of the contracting parties, was second only to New York.56 
The significance of this striking differential in party preference is illu- 
minated in a recent paper by Geoff Miller that analyzes the differences in 
contract law between New York and California.57 Miller's analysis confirms 
the conventional wisdom: New York strictly enforces bargains and displays 
little tolerance of efforts to balance interests ex post; California, by contrast, 
is far more willing to adopt fault-based considerations and to revise con- 
tracts on the grounds of fairness, equity, or public policy. As Miller 
concludes, "[t]he revealed preferences of sophisticated parties support ar- 
guments by Schwartz, Scott and others that formalistic rules offer superior 
value for the interpretation a d enforcement of commercial contracts."58 
The theory and evidence that support the normative case for strict liabil- 
ity in contract are partial in two respects. First, they are partial because the 
theory and evidence largely apply to commercially sophisticated parties. 
Thus, the normative claims for strict liability have less force, if any, when 
applied to other areas of contract law, and particularly those that concern 
53. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial 
Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99Mich. 
L. Rev. 1724(2001). 
54. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts (N.Y.U. Or. 
For Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 124, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/ 
papers/124. 
55. Id. at 21, 36. Delaware was a distant second to New York, with about 15 percent of the 
parties choosing its law. No other state accounted for even 10 percent of the choices of law. Id. at 21 . 
56. Id. at 21. 
57. Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining on the Red-eye: New Light on Contract Theory (N.Y.U. 
Ctr. For Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 131, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/ 
papers/131. 
58. Id. at I. 
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contracts made by relatively unsophisticated parties. The case is partial in a 
second respect as well: strict liability in contract exists largely in a narrow 
domain - the primary behavior of the promisor and promisee, respectively, 
in the performance of the contract and in reliance on that performance. Nev- 
ertheless, the theory and evidence supporting strict liability rules within 
those two domains is largely unchallenged. 
Conclusion 
The claim that strict liability in contract is a myth59 faces two formidable 
obstacles. First, the claim is descriptively inaccurate. At the core of contrac- 
tual obligations, strict liability is alive and well. If one focuses on what 
courts actually do, there is substantial evidence that they decline opportuni- 
ties to use the willful breach doctrine to deter inefficient promisor breaches, 
and, in addition, they decline opportunities to deploy the mitigation princi- 
ple to deter inefficient overreliance by promisees. Second, the claim is 
normatively problematic. Notions of autonomy and efficiency both support 
the claim that, in assessing performance and the response to nonperform- 
ance, commercial parties will prefer strict liability rules to fault-based rules. 
While the evidence is incomplete, it is nevertheless significant that the 
available theory and evidence point in one direction - significant enough to 
shift he intellectual burden of proof. 
59. See Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 1, at 1312 ("But we have already seen that strict 
liability is a myth."). 
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